





Civil wars, though defined at the intrastate level, rarely remain a conflict between 
insurgents and their government adversaries. Civil wars provide a platform for larger 
international tensions and dynamics that transcend state boundaries. Often, foreign states 
intervene to support a particular group’s trajectory in the conflict. This assistance can range from 
direct monetary funding, military advising, to the provision of training, funds, safe havens, 
intelligence, weapons, and additional critical resources for warring actors. The thesis examines 
the interaction between foreign support and insurgent behaviors. Specifically, it pursues the 
following question: how does foreign sponsorship affect insurgent treatment of civilians in civil 
conflicts? In addressing this question, the thesis employs a mixed-methodology analysis, pairing 
a quantitative study using the Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict (STAC) Dataset with 
exploratory cases from insurgents in El Salvador and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The 
quantitative analysis estimates a logistic regression and does not find a significant relationship 
between external support and insurgent-led civilian abuses, despite controlling for various 
insurgent, government, and conflict characteristics. From the case studies, the thesis finds the 
rebel forces that committed fewer civilian abuses all share a common characteristic: a strong 
political wing and aim. The thesis concludes that the relationship between external support and 
insurgent violence is insignificant, and that politically-legitimate rebel groups are more prone to 
show restraint toward civilians. Nonetheless, these findings are not definitive, and further 
research must be done to continue understanding and contributing to the topic of insurgent 
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Significance and Specific Aims 
1.1: Introduction 
In the mid-to-late 1970s, residents of Tierra Blanca, El Salvador joined in local protests 
and strikes against the state’s regime, eventually erupting into a civil war. Many of these citizens 
joined local guerilla organizations that would develop into Farabundo Marti Front for National 
Liberation (FMLN). During the following decade, the FMLN insurgent group and government 
forces maintained a strong presence in the state until both actors signed an interim treaty in 1991. 
The civil war redefined the political, economic, and social dynamics of Jiquilisco coast, 
empowering the insurgent group for the first time in El Salvador’s history. What is critical to 
note about FMLN’s behavior throughout the war, however, is its consistent effort to build 
cooperative relationships with civilians in the area. FMLN sought to win the “hearts and minds” 
of civilians during the period of conflict (Wood 2003). In Uganda, during the late 1990s, a group 
of rebel recruits known as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) mounted an insurgency against 
the Kampala government in an attempt to overthrow the regime. In contrast to FMLN’s approach 
of civilian toleration and cooperation, ADF engaged in violent raids, abductions, and killings, 
among other wartime atrocities (Prunier, 2009). These two examples, though only an 
abbreviation of insurgent behavior in times of conflict, drive the following question: Why do 
some insurgent groups resort to acts of terror against civilians in civil conflicts, while others do 
not? 
Civil wars, though defined at the intrastate level, provide a platform for larger 




states, international organizations, and other external actors intervene to influence and to 
motivate both the trajectory and outcome of conflict. This assistance ranges from direct monetary 
funding, military intervention, to the provision of safe havens, intelligence, weapons, and 
additional critical resources for warring actors (Cunningham, 2010). In examining the role of 
these actors within the intrastate conflict, scholars and policy-makers must not ignore the 
impressive capacity that third parties have in conflict behavior, resolution, and perpetuation. This 
thesis explores the relationship between foreign parties and one of the central players in civil 
conflict—insurgents. Specifically, the thesis pursues the following question: how does foreign 
sponsorship affect civilian targeting by supported insurgent groups? Combining quantitative 
analysis with case studies from insurgent groups in two conflicts, the thesis attempts to 
illuminate the circumstances under which insurgents choose to behave or disengage from acts of 
terror toward civilians in times of conflict. 
1.2: Policy Relevance 
While violence against civilians is an arguably inevitable feature of civil conflicts, it is in 
the interests of nations — especially those committed to upholding international law — to 
prevent and mitigate intrastate violence. This interest is particularly evident in cases in which an 
external state is involved in a civil conflict by providing a form of resource. The provision of 
support ultimately implicates the external state. According to data collected by Cunningham et 
al. (2009) a majority of all active rebel groups since 1945 have received some form external 
support or have ties to an external state. Support from external states can “significantly and 
quickly” augment a rebel group’s role in the civil conflict (Salehyan et al., 2014). As such, these 
foreign connections can discourage insurgent groups to forge ties with local populations; they 




ideological persuasion and service provision is costly; thus, insurgents with patronage from 
external actors can use time and resources for other pursuits (Salehyan et al., 2014). 
The thesis makes three contributions to public policy making within international 
relations. First, the research sheds new light on commonly held beliefs in policy circles and 
academia, probing the very theories that are often accepted as common wisdom in the realm of 
international relations. Second, it incorporates the most recent data on rebel behavior, capturing 
the dynamic nature of external support provision. Third, the research illuminates the need to 
reject the notion that civil conflicts are truly domestic. One of the most common funding 
mechanisms for armed insurgent groups is external state sponsorship. In future public policy 
making, third-party states and actors must be aware of the international dynamics at play in 
intrastate conflict. Foreign powers are often deeply involved in conflicts among national actors 
and must be critical of their intervention and its consequences on war behavior. 
Previous literature has highlighted the link between foreign external support and 
insurgents’ treatment of civilians, as well as how different sources of support affects the very 
relationship between insurgents and their treatment of civilians (Bapat, 2006). Results of this 
research will deepen our understanding of the political decision-making process of state 
sponsors. Foreign intervention is often costly for the third-party supporter. The intervening state 
must pay a direct expense generated by the conflict, and leaders will pay costs from audience at 
home if the war is unpopular (Snyder & Borghard, 2001). In addressing these costs, leaders from 
intervening states must be made aware of the potential effects their support can have in the 
conflict country. 
The US is no stranger to supporting insurgent groups, especially in civil conflicts where 




insurgents, such as the Mujahideen of Afghanistan, and the Nicaraguan Contras, who have 
committed civilian abuses. Against the backdrop of the ongoing debate of supporting rebel 
groups in the Middle East, US policy-makers and NGOs interested in protecting civilians must 
hold all actors accountable in conflicts. While support should be given to opposition groups who 
are committed to maintaining a transition of power from the current dictatorial regime, such as 
the Kurdish forces in Syria, the US should be critical of what insurgents do as a result of foreign 
support. There must be pressure on both insurgents and governments to withhold from 
committing civilian abuses; however, an even larger pressure must be placed on external states 
that shape combatant behavior to mitigate harmful insurgent behaviors in periods of conflict 
(Salehyan et al., 2014). 
1.3: Central Questions and Hypothesis 
Ultimately, this thesis attempts to further our general understanding of external support in 
civil wars, focusing specifically on state support to rebel movements, or insurgents. In particular, 
it expands our knowledge regarding the effects of support and enhances our knowledge about the 
relationship between foreign support and insurgents’ treatment of civilians. This research is 
important, given that previous research indicates that the presence of external support adversely 
affects the dynamics and prospective management or resolution of armed conflicts. External 
support typically makes conflicts longer, deadlier and less likely to end in a peaceful, negotiated 
settlement (Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000; Heger & Salehyan, 2007; Cunningham, 2010). 
State sponsors influence both the willingness and ability of rebel groups to instigate political 
violence (Regan & Meachum, 2014) and can foster cohesion as well as fragmentation within the 
armed opposition (Lounsbery, 2016; Tamm, 2016). Rebels with access to external state sponsors 




executive once the war is over, and more prone to target civilians in acts of terror and violence 
(Wood, 2010; Johansson & Sarwari, 2017; Fjelde & Nilsson, 2012; Colaresi, 2014). It is the 
latter insurgent behavior, however, on which this research will focus. 
The thesis seeks to better understand insurgent behavior in times of conflict, specifically 
insurgents’ treatment of civilians. It asks the following questions: First, how does external 
support contribute to the treatment of civilians by an insurgent group? Second, what are the key 
components involved in the relationship between external support and an insurgent group’s 
treatment of civilians? Given the consensus in the previous literature, the hypothesis is that 
insurgent groups with foreign support are more likely to commit civilian abuses. In analyzing 
these questions, however, the thesis is designed to probe previous theories regarding this 
relationship, as well as provide relevant implications for insurgent support during times of war 
and conflict. The thesis examines a range of qualitative and quantitative data on insurgencies and 
provides insights into the contemporary use of external support toward insurgent groups.1.4: 
Plan for Thesis   
This research is organized into six chapters. The second chapter will examine past 
research to identify its broad conclusions, shortcomings, and unanswered questions— the chapter 
will also position this research within the context of several peer-reviewed investigations. The 
proceeding chapter, Methods, will discuss how data will be handled, including the definition of 
key variables, the dataset of interest, and study parameters. Because this thesis is a mixed-
methods research, the chapter will describe both the quantitative and qualitative methods that 
will be used to analyze the data and case studies collected and indicate how the results of the 
analysis will be used to answer the thesis’s central questions. Chapter 4, Results, will present and 




results within the context of previous findings. Chapter 5, Case Studies, will analyze two 
exploratory case studies in which insurgents chose to behave or disengage from acts of terror 
toward civilians in times of conflict. The final chapter, Discussion and Conclusions, will relate 
the findings to the question of interest and examine the extent to which the research question was 
answered. Limitations, generalizability, and errors will equally be explored. Lastly, the chapter 
will conclude with a discussion of the study’s policy implications, as well as suggestions for 





Literature Review  
     Research supports that foreign support and rebel-led civilian violence are related. In 
general, the literature finds that rebel groups with access to foreign are more likely to employ 
violence against civilians. The present question will thus be positioned within the discussion of 
the general trends regarding the relationship between external support and insurgent behavior in 
times of conflict. The literature largely supports the following trends on this topic. 
2.1: Background and Conceptual Framework: Understanding Insurgent Groups’ Employment of 
Violence against Civilians 
    Much of the previous literature on insurgent behavior examines group tendencies to 
engage in violence, focusing on micro-level changes in control and local power. Many studies 
attempt to answer a critical empirical question in the realm of civil conflicts: what motivates 
insurgent groups to employ violence against civilians when doing so appears to be a suboptimal 
strategy?  
Rebel Strategies, Capacities, and Resources 
Violence against civilians is a popular war strategy that insurgents use as a means to exert 
control in a dynamic civil conflict. Civilian violence surfaces in the shape of many forms in civil 
conflict, but it is used in an attempt to “reshape the strategic environment in a manner that abets 
the user’s conflict aims” (Wood et al., 2012). The use of violence incentivizes civilian decision-
making—if civilians avoid insurgent transgressions, they will thus avoid targeted attacks, 
sanctions, and abuses (Mason, 1996). As such, indiscriminate violence can be employed to alter 




Another approach is that violence is a function of insurgent capacity, as the strategies 
available to insurgents as well as the utility of any strategy is determined by the capabilities of an 
insurgent force. Holding all else equal, weaker insurgent groups are less capable of providing 
local supporters with material incentives to encourage collaboration—  as such, relative 
weakness limits the strategic options available for mobilizing support (Wood, 2003). These 
incentives require significant capabilities, as providing safe zones, security, and welfare services 
are costly for weaker insurgent groups (Wood, 2010). To provide these benefits, insurgency must 
acquire sufficient resources to gather civilian loyalty. As they do so, insurgents are better able to 
substitute selective coercion and positive incentives for indiscriminate violence against civilians 
to encourage cooperation. Insurgent capacity will diminish the relative difference between the 
cost of indiscriminate violence and more selective repression, thus allowing for insurgents to 
emphasize the latter. With higher capacity, comes greater control. More control facilitates the 
aforementioned substitution because greater control allows for more information access and the 
ability to more effectively police the population (Kalyvas, 2006).  
    Collier and Hoeffler (2004) introduced the idea that regardless of underlying 
grievances, rebel groups cannot sustain their causes without sufficient funding and resources. 
Particularly after the cold war, rebel groups could no longer extensively rely on Marxist-
Communist ideologies to garner support from politically aligned states and communities 
(Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). As a result, insurgents needed to seek out alternative options for 
support, such as illicit trade and smuggling (these features will be further explored through case 
studies examined in Chapter 5). For example, while the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
exploited diamond mining in Sierra Leone, the leftist-Socialist Sandinistas in Nicaragua relied on 




Weinstein (2005) also examines the role of information and resources, exploring how 
resource endowments influence the character and behavior of insurgent forces. Weinstein (2005) 
situates the study in the context of a rebel “resource curse” theory, which he compares to one that 
undermines state institutions in resource-heavy areas. For the case of insurgents, organizations 
that are heavily endowed with resources attract opportunistic recruits who do not commit to the 
insurgent group's cause. Rebel organizations with insufficient endowments appeal to recruits 
who join the operation because of the group’s political goals. The groups with fewer 
endowments must forge bonds and closer relationships with constituents and local populations 
because they depend on them for additional forms of support (shelter, food, funding, to name a 
few). For example, Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) was forced to contract with 
civilians, help establish more democratic institutions, and withhold from employing violence as 
it lacked resources and endowments in Sudan (Weinstein, 2007). It is through fostering 
collaboration and trust that insurgent groups can rely on goods and commitments from local 
civilians for their cause (Wood, 2003). Altogether, these findings suggest that insurgent violence 
toward is a function of capabilities and resources but is ultimately employed as a strategic means 
to alter the conflict landscape.  
Insurgent-Government Interactions   
The interaction between insurgent forces and their adversaries can significantly impact 
the level of non-combatant civilian violence in conflicts. For example, insurgent attacks toward 
civilians can indicate a regime’s inability to control or protect civilians, thus discouraging them 
from supporting state governments (Henriksen, 1983). To achieve this, insurgents often attack 
their adversaries’ handling of power and control. For example, Viet Cong violence in the 1960s 




areas. The Party consequently became the ruler and provider for civilians in the area (Race, 
1972). Insurgent may employ violence tactics against civilians to undermine the benefits of 
regime support. The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) attacked government 
facilities, such as health and education centers, in an attempt to remove any public benefits 
associated with their current regime’s reign (Hultman, 2009).  
    Wood et al. (2012) contend that whether insurgent violence is successful in garnering 
or discouraging civilian support is conditional on the government’s response. For example, if a 
government entity implements counterinsurgent policies that relieve civilians of rebel-led 
violence, then the state is more likely to elicit civilian support and undermine insurgent 
legitimacy (Mason & Krane, 1989). Kalyvas asserts that the direction of this relationship is 
particularly true if insurgents are relatively weaker than their government, and the government is 
“willing to gamble on their inability to protect civilians” (Kalyvas, 2004). Sometimes, this may 
lead to insurgent violence having a perverse effect of exacerbating government violence against 
civilians. Insurgents may exploit this effect, increasing their civilian abuses to induce a more 
violent response from the government (Wood, 2010).  
Prior research also suggests that rebel-led violence is impacted by the relative strength of 
an insurgent group to its government. Both Wood and Metelits find that stronger rebels are less 
likely to commit civilian abuses toward non-combatant individuals. While Wood argues that 
relative strength allows for rebel groups to be more capable of providing benefits to loyal 
population members, Metelits contends that insurgent groups who face stiff competition from 
their government are more likely to be violent toward civilians (Wood, 2010; Metelits, 2010). 
Due to their lack of governance, experience, and state resources, insurgents are considered weak 




thus considered inextricably linked to insurgent employment of violence. As such, the 
relationship between civilian violence and these factors enumerated in previous literature reveals 
the importance of considering government strategies in the present research.  
Conflict Characteristics  
Though it is not researched as extensively as other factors for rebel-led violence, some 
prior studies study the effect of the type of civil conflict on insurgent violence. While much 
research has explored the causes of ethnic violence, Kalyvas’s study probes the dynamics of civil 
war violence in ethnic civil wars (2000). He finds intra-group abuse is a significant component of 
ethnic wars, and even exceed inter-group violence. To ensure support for the revolution, 
insurgent violence in ethnic conflicts is often directed against an insurgent group’s people (Paget, 
1967). As for ideological and religious conflicts, previous literature suggests they are more 
violent, though they do not explicitly explore the extent to which insurgent violence is impacted 
by the type of conflict (Reychler, 1997).  
As for secessionist conflicts, Jo (2015) writes extensively about the effect that 
secessionist aims have on an insurgent group’s treatment of civilians in secessionist conflicts. Jo 
(2015) puts forth a theory of rebel compliance to international law she calls a "legitimacy-based 
theory of rebel compliance." Jo (2015) contends that rebels who seek legitimacy are more likely 
to comply with international laws, and thus commit far fewer civilian abuses if they possess the 
three legitimacy-seeking indicators— having a strong political arm, receiving support from 
human rights-conscious states, and having secessionist aims (Jo, 2015). Rebels in a secessionist 
conflict which also have secessionist aims hope to establish a country of their own, which 




domestic legitimacy means that rebels will want to abide by international laws to satisfy their 
local constituency, and therefore refrain from employing civilian abuses (Jo, 2015).    
    Because of the lack of extensive research on the effect of conflict characteristics on the 
relationship between external interventions and civilian abuses, the present research will control 
for all four of these conflict types.  
External Interventions and Civilian Abuses 
Since 1945, the majority of rebel groups has received explicit support from an external 
actor or is alleged to have connections with foreign entities. According to the NSA dataset, 
among the 251 rebel groups that existed between 1990 and 2010, 93 had explicit support from 
foreign governments, 33 had alleged support, and 119 had no foreign state support (Jo, 2015). 
Evidently, foreign sponsorship is a substantial portion of rebel groups’ support type. This third-
party support not only can augment a group’s capabilities but also reduce the likelihood to forge 
bonds with locals— sometimes external support can even erode previous cooperation between 
insurgents and civilian populations. Simply, ideological persuasion and service provision is 
costly; thus, insurgents with patronage from external actors can use time and resources for other 
pursuits (Salehyan et al., 2014).  
The most recent study on the relationship between external support and insurgents’ 
civilian violence is Salehyan et al.’s principal-agent analysis of wartime atrocities (2014). The 
authors contend that foreign state funding for rebel organizations significantly discourages rebels 
from “winning the hearts and minds” of civilians because there is no need to gain resources from 
local populations in times of conflict. In conducting their study, Salehyan et al. (2014) situate 
foreign funding of insurgents in principal-agent terms, proposing that some external principals 




multiple state principals can yield more atrocities because no single state can prevent the 
insurgents from committing war crimes against civilians. Above all, they hypothesize that rebel 
organizations with external support are more likely to employ one-sided violence against 
civilians that those without external help.  
Overall, Salehyan et al. (2014) find that external sponsorship encourages civilian 
violence by insurgent groups receiving support from non-democratic sponsors. Their study 
furthers this understanding by presenting a principal-agent theory of violence, a framework that 
suggests substituting foreign support for local support reduces the checks on violence. This 
particular research has been critical to the presented research question, as it offers the first large-
N, cross-national empirical study of the effect of external support on the level of insurgent-led 
civilian violence. The authors were able to find results that strongly supported their hypotheses.  
Jo’s theory of legitimacy-based rebel compliance also explores the specific relationship 
between rebel-led civilian abuses and external sponsorship. In particular, rebel groups who 
receive aid from human rights-conscious groups (which is one of the three legitimacy-seeking 
indicators for rebel groups) are more likely to comply with international standards and refrain 
from employing violence against non-combatant civilians. For example, Jo finds that insurgents 
receiving aid from the United States (Jondullah in Iran) versus rebels who receive assistance 
from Charles Taylor’s Liberia (e.g., the RUF in Sierra Leone) are more likely to follow human 
rights standards. This is because they will be influenced by the human rights-conscious demands 
of the foreign sponsor (2015).  
    However, the relationship found in these studies are disputed. There is in fact 




domestic conflict environment, and that macro-level changes (such as external interventions) 
have impacts on occurrences at the micro-level (individual abuses) (Kalyvas & Balcells, 2010) 
While changes in foreign support for insurgents has significantly changed the observed 
warfare in civil conflicts, there is not full consensus about the direction of change. For example, 
Wood et al. (2012) find that military interventions alter the power balances between conflict 
actors, as well as actor incentives to abuse civilians. In particular, they find that intervention 
would reduce the level of violence committed by an insurgent group receiving the intervening 
support. It is these very discrepancies that motivate the present research to pursue this question 
further.  
Broader Implications of Foreign Support: External Involvement and Civil War Dynamics 
While insurgents receive many forms of foreign support, the impact of assistance varies 
among the type of insurgent group, external supporter, and nature of the conflict. For example, 
the duration of the conflict is an endogenous outcome explored as a result of external support to 
insurgent groups. The general notion is that outside interventions contribute to the prolonging of 
conflict. Regan (2002) estimates a hazard model with 150 conflicts from 1945-1999, 101 of 
which had a total of 1036 individual interventions. He finds that foreign interventions—  both in 
the form of military and economic instruments—  for rebel groups alone greatly increases the 
expected duration of a conflict. In a study exploring the number of fatalities following foreign 
support, Heger and Salehyan (2007) conduct an empirical analysis of over 200 armed civil 
conflicts and find that rebel strength is positively correlated with battle deaths, and is significant 
across all models. As they hypothesized, stronger rebel operations generated more intense battles 
with governments since the opposition coalition can display more conventional military tactics. 




external support (Heger & Salehyan, 2000). Another effect of external support for rebels on the 
dynamics of civil war is its impact on the likelihood of a negotiated resolution. D. Cunningham 
(2010), finds that external states often intervene in civil wars to pursue an agenda that does not 
align with the goals of the internal insurgents. Consequently, wars are more difficult to resolve 
because a) the intervention introduces an additional character that must approve a conflict 
termination settlement, and b) external actors are typically less incentivized to negotiate than 
internal actors because they do not bear the same costs for fighting and reap fewer benefits from 
war termination (Cunningham, 2010). These studies reveal, to some extent, evidence of diverse 
impacts of the external provision of insurgent support.  
Ultimately, the precise sequence of events following foreign support of rebel groups is a 
vital question, but one for which we lack a comprehensive theoretical understanding from which 
to conclude vast empirical findings. In recognizing this, the following research thus focuses on a 
specific behavioral outcome of external support (civilian victimization) in an attempt to reach as 
sufficient of a theoretical understanding as possible of insurgent treatment of civilians.  
2.2 Weaknesses of Prior Literature  
Of all previous literature, the present research engages in the closest dialogue with 
Salehyan et al.’s study, as its quantitative approach to the research question is most similar to the 
one pursued in this analysis. For the current research, Salehyan et al.’s study is deficient in a few 
ways. The data used in the study only crudely account for the existence of support, and by whom 
support was provided. The Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset has many missing values and limits 
the study to observations only representing the post-Cold War Era. Although the study provides 




more in-depth evidence and texture to the relationships that supported by the negative binomial 
model. 
While the study incorporates models to account for the type of sponsor (democratic, non-
democratic, affiliated with human rights lobbies), it does not consider for the type of conflict. 
Indeed, the study is framed by the principal-agent theory, but its faults lie in its inability to 
incorporate controls for the category of conflict—  whether it is an ethnic, secessionist, religious, 
or ideological conflict. These characteristics can contribute to the conflict landscape over which 
the insurgent and their adversaries attempt to exert control.  
2.3 Contribution to Literature  
    This thesis relies on the previous literature as a starting point from which to further 
develop this question of external support’s effect on insurgent-led violence and contributes to the 
existing body of research in several ways. The following research uses the Strategies and Tactics 
in Armed Conflict (STAC) Dataset, the most recent dataset on domestic armed conflict and 
foreign regime maintenance. The dataset includes variables ranging from conflict identifiers and 
counterinsurgency characteristics to intervention identifiers and outcomes. There are 200 
observations from civil conflicts occurring between the years 1946 and 2013, making this dataset 
more up-to-date than the NSA and Uppsala Armed Conflict Database. The fact that this dataset 
will cover recent civil conflicts in the first decade of this century allows the study to incorporate 
contemporary conflicts, such as those in Mali, Afghanistan, and Nigeria after 2009 (the Uppsala 
dataset does not include observations after 2009). 
The thesis also controls for more variables to refine better the theories put forth by 
previous authors. These authors do not account for various factors that can considerably affect 




this research will control for four groups of control variables: insurgent characteristics, 
intervention features, government strategies, and conflict characteristics. Controlling for these 
characteristics will offer a more complete analysis of the circumstances under which insurgent 
commit war crimes against civilians. In fact, no previous literature controls for all four conflict 
characteristics incorporated in this study. While previous literature has exclusively explored one 
or a few of these possibly significant control variables, this research incorporates all of these 
related factors of civil violence. It is critical for policy-makers to be aware of the co-occurrences 
of these additional phenomena, as they will better inform policy-makers of their opportunities for 
intervention.  
Ultimately, the thesis allows policy-makers to provide more complete answers to 
questions about the effect of external support as it relates to insurgent use of civilian violence. If 
the results indicate a new relationship to what has been already considered common wisdom in 
the realm of this topic, policy-makers can account for insurgent behavior when considering what 
sort of external sponsorship to implement, and it may inform other policies, such as off-shore or 








3.1 Data and Variables of Interest  
In order to test the relationship between external support and rebel-led civilian abuses, the 
following research uses the Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict (STAC) Dataset. This 
dataset utilized original data collection and coding methods and was constructed by Patricia L. 
Sullivan and Johannes Karreth (2016). It features the most up-to-date original data collection on 
strategies and tactics in armed conflict. The STAC Dataset is comprised of two separate sections, 
Domestic Armed Conflict Dataset and Foreign Regime Maintenance (FRM) Dataset. While the 
former includes observations on conflict identifiers, conflict characteristics, counterinsurgency 
characteristics, and conflict outcomes; the FRM Dataset provides data on intervention identifiers, 
intervention characteristics, and intervention outcome. Overall, the STAC Dataset includes 99 
variables, with a total of 200 observations from global conflicts between the years of 1945 and 
2013 (Sullivan & Karreth, 2016).  
Insurgent Treatment of Civilians      
The unit of analysis is the individual insurgent organization, with one observation per 
conflict. The STAC Dataset identifies the individual rebel organization as the primary opposition 
group that opposed the central government, retrieved from both the UCDP Dyadic Dataset and 
various sources contributing to the coding of the STAC Dataset. The present research benefits 
from the disaggregation of conflict to the level of the rebel group, as it allows behaviors to be 
explored among specific rebel groups. As the literature suggests, rebel behavior varies across 




organizations allows one to examine the behaviors of each observed opposition group in the 
dataset.  
The independent variable of interest is rebel-led civilian violence. This variable describes 
whether or not rebel forces intentionally select civilians as direct objects of abuse or consistently 
fail to discriminate between combatants and non-combatants in their insurgent operations 
(Sullivan & Karreth, 2016). This variable was originally coded as having a value of 0 (if there 
were rare or no cases of civilian targeting), 1 (if there were moderate instances of civilian 
targeting), and 2 (if there were extensive instances of civilian targeting). To better fit the test 
model, the independent variable was re-coded to a binary variable, such that a value of 1 
indicates a moderate or extensive use of civilian targeting, and a value of 0 indicates rare or no 
cases of civilian abuse. Table 3.1 provides the variable name and descriptive statistics of this 
variable and all other key variables in this study. The reported means represent the percentage of 
observations that have the variable’s characteristics. For example, the 0.46 mean value for the 
insurgent treatment of civilian variable indicates that approximately 46% of the rebel groups in 
the STAC dataset have targeted civilians. (Table 3.1).  
External Support  
The main dependent variable of interest is the external support to rebel groups. This 
variable is a binary indicator coded as 1 if any foreign state provided any form of support to 
assist the rebels. This variable describes any form of support—  this includes military assistance, 
state-engaged combat, arms and material aid, economic support, or the provision of sanctuaries. 
There are separate binary variables that specifically describe each of these forms of support and 
will be included in the test models. Approximately 59% of the rebel groups in this study have 




As the literature suggests many factors can contribute to an insurgent’s employment of 
violence against civilians, this research will thus incorporate additional control variables 
regarding conflict characteristics, insurgent characteristics, government tactics, and foreign 
support characteristics. 
Types of Foreign Support  
 This group of variables will represent the different types of external support to rebel 
groups. These variables specify the type of foreign support provided to rebel groups, such as 
engaging in combat, providing arms or other material aid, providing economic support, 
providing sanctuaries for rebels, and advising a rebel group. All of these variables are coded as 
binary.  
Insurgent Characteristics  
 Previous literature suggests that stronger rebels are less likely to target the population 
because they are better able to provide safety, civilian benefits, and recruitment strategies which 
foster loyalty between rebels and civilians (Wood, 2010); thus, the research controls for the 
relative balance of the rebel group against its government counterpart. This variable describes 
whether or not rebel groups have an equal or higher number of troops than their government at 
the height of the conflict. It is a binary variable, coded 0 if the rebel group did not have an equal 
or higher number of troops, and 1 if the rebel group did.  
Government Tactics 
The research controls for two government strategies: air strikes and government-led 
civilian targeting. The variable for airstrikes is categorical and describes the extent to which the 




describes the extent to which the government has targeted civilians. This variable is also 
categorical and is coded as rare, moderate, and extensive.  
Conflict Characteristics   
Four variables are included that describe types of conflict— all of which are binary. 
These variables describe whether or not the conflict is primarily a religious conflict, a 
secessionist conflict, an ethnic conflict, or an ideological conflict. All are coded as 0 if No (the 
conflict does not primarily exhibit the specified characteristic), and 1 if Yes (the conflict does 
primarily exhibit the specified characteristic).  
3.2 Test Models  
 The analysis uses a logistic regression model (logit model) to test the hypothesis. Because 
the dependent variable (rebel civilian targeting) is binary, the research will thus estimate a 
logistic regression model. This deviates from the similar test conducted by Salehyan et al., which 
estimated a negative binomial model to better suit its time-series, continuous dependent variable.  
The logistic regression approach models the probability of dichotomous outcome variables—  
the log odds of the outcome (rebel-led civilian targeting) is modeled as a linear combination of 
the predictor variables. The logit command displays an estimate for a constant and the coefficient 
both expressed in terms of log odds of the dependent variable. 
The analysis runs thirteen separate logit models. Model 1 is the most basic—  it presents 
the relationship between the binary variables for foreign support and the insurgent groups 
targeting of civilians. Models 2 through 6 consider the type of foreign intervention, and Models 7 




3.3 Advantages and Limitations 
 The logistic regression test is a useful technique that allows for researchers to estimate 
predictive models. It is most helpful in understanding the influence of several variables on a 
single binary outcome. Though this test is useful, it has some limitations. First, logistic 
regressions cannot be used to predict continuous outcomes, which limits research that works with 
a continuous scale. Within the scope of this question, the logistic regression would thus be 
unable to predict the extent or the number of civilian abuses committed by rebel groups as a 
result of having received some foreign funding. Second, for logistic regression to be most 
accurate, each data point must be independent of other data points in the regression. Independent 
variables that are related to each other will result in the model overweighing the significance of 
the related variables (Morgan & Teachman, 1988). In the present study, some control variables—  
such as the intervention features and conflict characteristics—  are correlated with one another. 
As such, each control variable will be tested in a separate test for each model in Chapter 4.   
Despite these limitations, the structure of the response variable suggests that the binary 
logistic regression is the most appropriate estimation for this research. With this in mind, the 
following section will provide and discuss the results of this statistical method.  
3.4 Case Study Methodology  
This thesis incorporates a mixed-methods approach to answering the research question—
how external support affects an insurgent group’s treatment of civilians in times of civil conflict. 
As such, two cases are analyzed to build a more accurate description and explanation of external 
support for insurgent groups in times of civil conflict. In the quantitative portion of this study, 
the regularities of the studied question are identified by manipulating numbers to produce 




assessed by estimating the variability within the data to reach a probability that the relationship 
represents the behavior of the population. The logic of the qualitative portion of this study 
follows the same approach, but the way in which regularities and meanings are assessed is 
different (GAO, 1990).  
In this research, the case studies are used to present a comprehensive and extensive 
understanding of complex instances of insurgent behavior in civil conflicts where external 
support was provided. The case studies provide an in-depth account of these instances about the 
contextual events and external factors by which the instances are being influenced (GAO, 1990). 
The first case describes the M23 rebel group’s treatment of civilians following the First and 
Second Congo War in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The second explores the behavior of 
the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) in the context of El Salvador’s civil 
war. The analysis compares these instances to provide an exploratory case study— a type of case 
study that evaluates cause and effect where considerable uncertainty exists about a program 
(external support). This type of case study is undertaken before further investigation to develop 
evaluation measures and questions for future research. Because the quantitative analysis yielded 
insignificant coefficients—  indicating that there is not a significant relationship between 
insurgent violence and external support—  the exploratory type of case study allows for this 
thesis to move forward, looking for trends that can inform future research regarding the question 
at hand. The cases in this thesis motivate expectations, measurement constructs, and questions 
for studies pursued later on (King et al., 1994).       
The design features of an exploratory case study are that the number of cases is sufficient 
to cover diversity, analysis is closely concurrent with the statistical analysis, and each case is 




mind, the two cases are selected to represent critical variations in civil conflict and insurgent 
characteristics that can affect insurgent behaviors: foreign support from various countries, 
political characteristics, and notable restraint toward civilians.  
The first case from the DRC focuses on the M23 insurgent group but follows several 
competing rebel factions in the country. This allows for comparisons to be made among rebel 
groups themselves, as they are all situated in the same context. Most of the rebel groups in the 
first case have received foreign support and have committed civilian abuses, but each rebel group 
defined by unique characteristics— this diversity allows for the thesis to compare insurgent 
behaviors across each group. The second case provides an example of a conflict with just two 
primary actors: a strong insurgent group and a government adversary. In El Salvador’s, the 
FMLN grew to be one of the most active and successful rebel groups in the post-Cold War era. 
The FMLN received notable foreign support but demonstrated much more restraint toward 
civilians than its government counterpart (Karl, 1992).  
The exploratory case studies are critical for developing future evaluation questions and 
measures for the research question; however, like any methodology there are limitations.  First, 
the two exploratory cases may not adequately represent the diversity of insurgent group 
behaviors. The sample size is small, which makes it difficult to achieve full coverage of 
diversity. Second, exploratory cases studies run the risk of premature conclusions, as the 
exploratory findings may be prematurely released as conclusions without enough evidence. 
Lastly, this type of case study is susceptible to the over-involvement of the evaluator’s hunches 








4.1: Statistical Analysis 
Model 1  
The first model in the following statistical analysis is the most basic one, as it solely tests 
the likelihood of a rebel groups’ use of civilian abuse as a result of receiving foreign support. As 
shown in Table 1, the constant is the estimated log odds of civilian targeting by rebel groups who 
have not received any foreign support. This value is negative, meaning that rebel groups who 
have not received foreign support are less likely to target civilians. The p-value for this 
coefficient is insignificant at 0.05 level, which renders this constant value insignificant. Because 
the p-value is greater than the significance level, it cannot be concluded that there is a 
statistically significant association between civilian targeting and external support. This outcome 
leads to the conclusion that there is something missing from this model, and that there may be 
other factors for which this research should control.  
Types of Intervention  
Models 2 through 6 consider five specific types of foreign support toward rebels: combat, 
arms, weaponry, economic aid, the provision of sanctions, or military assistance and advising. 
When solely looking at the sign of these coefficients, the models show that when controlling for 
combat, arms, sanctions, and military assistance and advising, a rebel group is more likely to 
abuse civilians if they receive external support. Only in the case of providing arms is the 
relationship between rebel-led civilian violence and foreign support negative. Interpreting this 




violence. The coefficients in this model are insignificant, but when running the logistic 
regression with the variable representing military assistance and advising, the p-value yields a 
value of 0.475. Though it is still insignificant, it is closer to a standard level of statistical 
significance than the all-encompassing foreign support variable in Model 1. The rest of the 
statistical analysis thus uses this variable (targhelp) as the primary independent variable when 
controlling for the remaining variables. Table 4.1 provides the values of all coefficients for 
Models 2 through 6, along with their standard errors, number of observations, and constant 
values.  
(Table 4.1) 
 Controlling for Insurgent Strength  
 The Model 7 controls for the relative strength of the insurgent group to its government 
counterpart. Controlling for whether or not rebel groups have an equal or higher number of 
troops than their government at the height of the conflict (strongrebs) yielded a value 
insignificant at the 0.05 threshold. In this model, there is not a statistically significant association 
between civilian targeting and external support when controlling for the relative strength of 
rebels to government forces.  
 Controlling for Government Tactics 
 When controlling for the government’s use of air strikes and the government’s targeting 
of civilians, the coefficients are both insignificant at the 0.05 threshold. As such, there is not a 
statistically significant association between civilian targeting and foreign support when 
controlling for these government tactics. These values are indicated under Models 8 and 9 in 
Table 4.2.  




 After controlling for conflict characteristics, the analysis yielded results provided in 
Table 4.2, under Models 10 through 13. These four models considered four conflict 
characteristics: religious, ethnic, secessionist, and ideological conflicts. However, after running 
each control variable in a separate test (this is due to the fact that each conflict is correlated with 
one another), all signs were positive and no value was significant at the 0.05 threshold. This 
suggests that there is not a statistically significant association between civilian targeting and 
external support when controlling for any type of conflict.  
(Table 4.2)  
4.2: Implication of Analysis  
 At this point, it is clear that all coefficients of the statistical analysis are insignificant. 
These findings deviate from previous studies and literature, most notably the study conducted by 
Salehyan et al., with which the present research engages the most direct dialogue. In the present 
study’s most basic test— Model 1, which solely tests the relationship between foreign support 
and a rebel group’s civilian abuses—  the present study finds an insignificant relationship. The 
same statistical model was run in the Salehyan et al. study (although the statistical method uses 
was a negative binomial model). While this study finds the same sign for the coefficient for 
targeted support, Salehyan et al.’s test achieves statistical significance at the 0.05 level. From just 
this test, they were able to find some support for the general hypothesis that external support for 
rebel groups increases their likelihood to employ violence against non-combatant civilians 
(Salehyan et al., 2014).  
Previous literature contends that rebel groups with greater capabilities and strength 
employ less violence toward non-combatant civilians, as rebels are better suited to foster loyalty 




provide that weaker insurgents sharply escalate violence against civilians, as the relationship 
between rebel capabilities and civilian violence is negative and significant (Wood, 2010). This 
research did not find a significant coefficient at the 0.05 threshold; thus, it cannot be concluded 
that rebels with greater capabilities relative to the government use less violence against civilians. 
In fact, the coefficient value does not even share the same sign as the model reported in Wood’s 
study.  
Wood’s study also finds a significant independent relationship between government and 
rebel violence, concluding that as governments become more violent and competitive, rebels will 
respond with a greater level of violence toward civilians. This relationship was tested in Model 8 
when controlling for the government’s use of strategic air strikes. In contrast to Wood’s study, 
the present research found a negative and insignificant coefficient when controlling for 
government’s strategic air bombing. Metelits’ study suggests similar results to Wood, arguing 
that insurgent groups that must compete with government forces are more likely to engage in 
violence against civilians (Metelits, 2010). After controlling for both strategic air strikes and the 
government's provision of public benefits, the present study still did not find a significant 
relationship. Salehyan et al. controls for similar variables but found contradictory results to 
Wood and Metelits. Salehyan et al. find that rebel groups with at least a moderately high level of 
fighting capacity are more likely to engage in high levels of violence against civilians (Salehyan 
et al., 2014). While the present study finds a relationship of the similar sign, the result of this test 
was insignificant.  
This discrepancies between the present research and previous studies may be driven by 
many factors. First, the outcomes could be a product of differences in measures. Salehyan et al. 




quantitative variable, while combat capabilities of rebels is a binary indicator of combat 
capabilities. Wood’s variable for rebel capabilities, for instance, was a ratio of troop counts. 
While the measures should correlate, they may capture different features of variables, such as 
rebel capabilities, violence, support, etc. These differences in variable measures can perhaps 
explain the discrepancies among the previous literature itself, as well as this present research 
with prior studies. Second, the discrepancies between the present results and those of previous 
literature could be a product of the differences in datasets. The relationships that have been 
considered significant in previous literature are not maintaining significance with a newer, more 
accurate dataset. Of course, data availability is limited, which explains why much of the previous 
literature are using data from similar sources—  the NSA and Uppsala Armed Conflict databases. 
The present research uses a dataset that has not been utilized by any other study. 
The insignificant coefficients from this present research suggest that the relationship 
between foreign support and rebel groups’ use of violence against non-combatants cannot be 
definitively concluded. Ultimately, these results indicate that further research must be done. The 
inconsistencies and variance among all literature on this question motivate the present research 






The following exploratory cases include rebel groups who have received foreign support, 
but have not committed civilian abuses, and vice versa. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
why rebels decide whether or not to exercise restraint in their armed struggle, and when foreign 
support affects this restraint. Particularly due to the statistical analysis’ insignificant coefficients, 
the following chapter will illuminate specific historical and contemporary examples of 
circumstances under which insurgents chose to behave or disengage from acts of terror toward 
civilians in times of conflict.  
5.1: The Rebels of Democratic Republic of Congo, M23 and Competing Insurgent Forces  
Conflict Background  
 In 1998, a year after the end of the First Congo War, friction between Congo President 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila and Rwanda threatened the deterioration of Kabila-Rwandese relations. 
Rumors of the Rwandan-led assassination of Kabila surfaced throughout the Kabila regime, and 
by July 27, the Kabala regime severed the Rwandan Mission of Cooperation, and the Rwandan 
military was asked to leave the DRC. By August, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo (FARDC)—the state military operation responsible for defending the DRC—  
declared the destitution of President Kabila. Fights began developing in Kinshasa, as Tutsi 
soldiers refused to disarm; meanwhile, the Kabila regime carried out a pogrom against all Tutsi 
people in Kinshasa and neighboring cities. On August 4, a plane full of Rwandan and Ugandan 
soldiers landed in Lower Congo at a base of 10-15,000 former Armed Zaire Forces (FAZ) who 
joined the uprising against Kabila. By the end of August, a group of Congolese politicians 




for Congolese Democracy (RCD). Following the establishment of this rebel operation, Angola 
attacked the Rwanda-Uganda-RCD positions in Lower Congo, and Zimbabwe followed with a 
military intervention in Kinshasa to support the Kabila regime. What resulted was the Second 
Congo War, which lasted from 1998 to 2003 (Weiss, 2000).  
While the RCD led the Second Congo War, the National Congress for the Defense of 
People (CNDP) succeeded this anti-regime force for four years, agreeing with the government in 
2009 that its soldiers would be invited into the national army. By 2012, former CNDP soldiers 
disaffiliated to form M23, simultaneously taking control of Goma in an uprising. M23 did not 
sustain the revolt for long—  after 18 months, government forces had reclaimed the M23-
controlled territories. In January of 2013, the UN voted on sanctions of two M23 leaders, and by 
December 2013 (BBC, 2012), M23 reached a Peace Agreement with the DRC government 
(Hogg, 2012). This agreement involved numerous regional and international efforts, as the UN 
Security Council and MONUSCO sent a peace-keeping force of 17,000, with a budget of USD 
1.4 billion per annum (Stearns et al., 2012).  
M23’s Insurgent Characteristics   
Before exploring the level of restraint M23 exhibited toward non-combatant civilians, it 
is critical to understand the group's insurgent characteristics. One of this group’s most defining 
traits is its strong political arm that was active while seeking international legitimacy for its 
movement. The leadership had a public relations spokesman, followed influential politicians in 
Congo and abroad, and ran an active Facebook web campaign. According to Jo (2015), the M23 
leadership was “keen to portray an image of political involvement to the international 
community” (2015). M23 did not have an explicit aim for autonomy, any territorial control, or 




were beaten harshly when they mistreated civilians) and foreign support from the Tutsi-based 
Rwandan Government (Lidow, 2008; Gorur, 2012a; Stearns et. al., 2012).  
In 2012, M23 stated its goal: to enforce the terms of a previous peace treaty with the 
government in 2009, which provided standards and protections for the treatment of former 
CNDP members. Over time, M23 goals looked beyond the army agreement in 2009 and became 
centered on broader political aims and civilian protection (Gorur, 2012a). On October 1 2012, 
Vianney Kazarama, the spokesperson for M23, stated “We are considering taking Goma and 
rescuing the population… we are going to protect them. We are going to prevent those crimes 
against civilians” (qtd. in Gorur, 2012b). M23’s explicit call for the protection of civilians was 
unprecedented in a conflict as a violent as the one in DRC (Jo, 2015). Kazarama even continued 
to claim that M23 only used light weapons to decrease the risk of civilian casualties, while the 
national army (FARDC), used tanks, helicopters, and mortars (Boutellis, 2012). These statements 
made by M23 give Jo (2015) reason to believe that a key strategy of M23 was to convey “we are 
better than the government” since it prioritized civilian welfare.  
As both groups shared the same Tutsi ethnic background, the principal supporter of M23 
was the Rwandan government, particularly toward the early years of the M23 movement. 
Rwanda was not under human rights influence and did not initially discourage violence in M23’s 
operations, but over time, international accusations forced the Rwandan government to only 
provide “limited” support by July 2013. M23 responded to this newly-dwindled support by 
taxing truck transportation and relying on the illegal trade in gold and ivory to finance their 
operations (BBC, 2013). Despite its oral commitment to civilian protection, M23 was not wholly 
innocent—  in fact, there are reports of its use of violence toward civilians. What is interesting to 




Rwanda. M23 recruited many children and broke promises to Rwanda and the international 
community once it lost a leading source of support (Smith, 2013). Beyond the forced recruitment 
of children, M23 has been accused of various human rights abuses including killings and rapes 
before and after receiving Rwandan support (Gorur, 2012b). Nonetheless, its decision to 
withdraw forces from Goma and toward a peace agreement surprised the international 
community, as it provided M23 the opportunity to end its violence against civilians.  
Understanding Restraint: M23 and Competing Rebel Forces  
 Beyond M23, DRC has an extensive and complicated rebel history. The presence of other 
insurgent groups allows for this analysis to directly compare M23’s behaviors and relationship 
with civilians against other rebel forces within the same conflict. The primary rebel groups in 
DRC are comprised of two main insurgent forces (RCD-Goma and CNDP) and four defense 
militias (Spittaels & Hilgert, 2008). Table 5.1 combines the table data from Jo, which compiles 
information from the NSA dataset, OSV dataset, Armed Conflict Location and Event Dataset 
(ACLED), as well as the civilian abuses recorded in the STAC (2016) dataset used in the 
statistical analysis of this research. This table also provides the level of rebel strength (measured 
by the number of rebel troops), political aims, civilian abuses, and foreign support.  
From Table 5.1, it is evident that most groups relied on Uganda, Rwanda, and illicit trade 
to finance their rebel operations. Like M23, RCD relied on financing from Rwanda, while UPC, 
MLC, AFDL, FRPI, and FNI gathered support from Uganda. What is also common across all 
groups is some —  at the very least — use of violence against civilians. While some groups 
exhibit greater force against civilians (FDLR and UPC have a far higher number of civilian 
killed than Mai Mai or CNDP), Jo argues one factor that correlates with this increased number of 




civilian fatalities suggests that rebel groups with stronger numbers are more likely to commit 
civilian abuses (2015). AFDLwas comprised of around 60,000 soldiers and killed over 29,500 
civilians. On the other, FRPI had only 9,000 soldiers and killed almost 300 civilians (Table, 5.1).  
Table 5.1 also shows that the variation in civilian abuses aligns with particular trends in 
political aims. Jo argues that this correlation is observed because politically-motivated rebel 
groups are less likely to abuse civilians. The datasets did not report observations for the 
Movement for Liberation of Congo (MLC), but the case of MLC can be useful in assessing why 
some rebel groups showed less restraint than M23. Jean-Pierre Bemba, former vice-president of 
the DRC, led the MLC, which was active in both the DRC and the Central African Republic 
(CAR). Due to this political career, Bemba was politically ambitious in the DRC and guided 
MLC toward restraint in the country. The same could not be said for CAR, where MLC activities 
were far more abusive toward civilians in the nation (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Jo argues that 
due to political-legitimacy aims, the MLC had no reason to show restraint against civilians in the 
CAR, which helps explain why MLC committed more abuses in the CAR than in the DRC 
(HRW, 2010). In this case, the political motivation was the driving force for showing civilian 
restraint.  
Overall, the case of M23 suggests that some rebel groups are intentional about following 
international standards and withholding from committing civilian abuses. Despite the fact that all 
rebel groups received funding, some committed more civilian violations than M23. M23’s 
conscious focus on political legitimacy and freedom guided M23 toward compliance. Rebel 
groups with a political wing that are seeking legitimacy are far more aware of international 
criminal law and prosecution (Jo, 2015). As such, these groups are more likely to adjust their 




level of international recognition that benefits their cause (Jo, 2015). Because MLC had a strong 
political arm with clear goals to secure conditions of 2009 peace agreement and earn greater 
government representation for Tutsi minorities (HRW, 2010), it exercised restraint in their 
insurgent operations. As opposed to groups in the DRC that seemed to have engaged in 
unconstrained civilian abuses, M23 maintained some level of compliance, primarily due to its 
organized and influential political wing (Trefon, 2013). In cases where other rebel groups also 
have a strong political wing and set of goals, a similar level of compliance is observed, such as 
the MLC force in the DRC.  
(Table 5.1) 
5.2: The Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front of El-Salvador 
Conflict Background  
Through a military coup, the right-wing National Conciliation Party (PCN) came to 
power in El-Salvador in 1961. During the mid to late 1970s, citizens of Tierra Blanca, El-
Salvador began protesting in local strikes and demonstrations after widespread discontent with 
the government (BBC, 2017). Some of these residents collaborated with guerrilla forces that 
would eventually become the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), a Marxist-
Leninist guerrilla group. By 1976, this unrest escalated when a coalition of landlords and military 
members blocked the government’s attempt for greater agrarian reform. Three years later, 
residents demonstrated again for higher wages and better working conditions on the Hacienda 
California—  this time, the demonstrations resulted in a greater employment of government 
forces and brutality. In an attempt to derail the insurgency, government forces expropriated 




(Wood, 2003). In 1979, General Romero was ousted in a coup by reformist officers who installed 
a military-civilian junta (BBC, 2017).  
What resulted was a decade-long war between two primary groups—  the FMLN and El 
Salvadoran government. The Cold War served as the backdrop to the crisis in El Salvador and 
prompted various foreign interventions (Allison, 2012). From 1980 to 1992, the FMLN engaged 
in extensive guerrilla warfare against the El Salvador government, which the United States 
supported politically, economically, and militarily. The FMLN also received support, particularly 
from Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, and France, who recognized the FMLN as a legitimate political 
force in 1981 (Tamayo, 1981).  After another year of fighting, the right-wing National 
Republican Alliance (ARENA) won the parliamentary election, resulting in more disappointment 
from leftist FMLN members. More violence ensued, and another ARENA candidate— Alfredo 
Cristiani— was elected in what was deemed a “rigged” election (Karl, 1992). As the conflict was 
nearing the end of its course, FMLN was recognized as a “representative” political force, and 
both the ARENA government and the FMLN signed an interim UN-sponsored peace accord in 
1991. The agreement outlined an agreement between the two parties and designated the end of 
the civil war that (Blandon, 1995).  
Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Characteristics 
 The FMLN was formed as a consolidation of various insurgent forces, including the 
Popular Forces of Liberation Farabundo Marti (FPL), the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), 
the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), the Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL), and 
the Revolutionary Workers Party of Central America (PRTC) (Allison, 2012). What these groups 
had in common was a politically-leftist ideology and ties to the agrarian workstyle, which had a 




topple what they considered a corrupt authority, the newly-formed FMLN launched a “final 
offensive” within five months, the first demonstration of its military power. The combination of 
clear political goals, civilian allies, and military strength allowed the FMLN to be recognized as 
a legitimate entity by international actors, most notably Mexico, France, Nicaragua, and Cuba. 
By 1983, Karl (1992) contends that the “rebels were actually winning the war.” 
 One of the most defining features of the FMLN was its support system, both local and 
international (McKinney, 2015). Sources indicate that the FMLN received aid in the form of 
sanctions, from Nicaraguan, Cuban, Mexican, and Costa Rican governments. Though aid from 
these actors did not amount to the level of support the US provided for the El Salvadoran 
government, the FLMN benefited tremendously from the ability to use Managua and Havana for 
operation meetings, as well as training and medical care facilities in Nicaragua and Cuba. 
Members of the FMLN and their families were also able to seek sanctuary in these supporting 
countries to avoid imprisonment and government death squads (Allison, 2012). It was the 
Communist support from Nicaragua, however, that strengthened the FLMN enough to develop a 
new strategy in 1981: Guerra Popular Prolongada (Prolonged Popular War), which attempted to 
prolong the war long enough for US Congress to withdraw support from the El Salvadoran 
government war (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995). Sharing a similar political ideology, other 
notable supporters were Vietnam and the Soviet Union, both of which provided funds and 
political training for the FLMN. The exact figure is unknown, but the amount of aid received by 
the FMLN and the diversity of sources guaranteed the endurance of the insurgency throughout a 
twelve-year war (Bracamonte & Spencer, 1995).      
Despite only maintaining an average of around 6,700 to 7,600 members, the FLMN 




had clear military, economic, and political objectives that characterized the insurgency as a 
legitimate force. Table 5.2 organizes the characteristics and goals of the FMLN and compares 
them to the government forces. Militarily, the FMLN sought to minimize civilian casualties, 
aiming for low-risk and high-visibility attacks in an attempt to “bleed” out the Salvadoran Army 
as soon as possible (CIA, 1998). In achieving this, FLMN knew it had to simultaneously attack 
economic facilities, so it increased its campaigns to destroy economic targets around the mid-
1980s. Doing so ensured minimal risk of civilian casualties while also exacerbating the 
government’s failure to control El Salvador’s economic problems. The FMLN’s diplomatic 
objectives were equally calculated, as it consistently pursued contacts among groups and foreign 
regimes that were sympathetic to their cause. Guerrilla leaders frequently visited Latin American 
and other foreign regimes in order to rally support for their operations and terms of negotiation 
(CIA, 1998). Its most prominent objective, however, was political— since its emergence, the 
FLMN was politically motivated, seeking a “power sharing” provisional government that would 
arrange new elections, reorganize the military, abolish the 1983 constitution and implement new 
democratic political rules (Karl, 1992). Yes, the FLMN was by definition a guerrilla insurgency 
like many in Latin America, but the group’s commitment to these political goals and strategic 
objectives situated it to be one of the most supported and successful rebel forces in the Cold War 
era (Grenier, 1991).  
In contrast, the counterinsurgency force was mostly led by the El Salvadoran 
government, the Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) that ruled for the majority of the 
civil war. Against the backdrop of the Cold War and a shared fear of the domino theory, the 
United States strongly supported the El Salvadoran government. Beginning with the Carter 




attach conditions to the support so that the El Salvadoran government would adhere to human 
rights standards. Under the Reagan administration, the US government felt even more compelled 
to maintain financial support and help the ARENA defeat the FLMN (Kyle, 2004). With a new 
consensus in Congress, the Reagan administration helped the ARENA government draft a new 
Constitution in 1983, provided US 1.8 million El Salvador’s 1984 presidential elections, and 
ensured the victory of Christian Democrat José Napoleón Duarte. Establishing its support 
further, the Reagan administration used the moderate image of Duarte’s presidency to provide up 
to USD 1.2 million a day to maintain the fight against the FMLN (Karl, 1992). Though the US 
threatened to withdraw support from the El Salvadoran government on numerous occasions after 
realizing the government failed to maintain a democratic human rights record, the US sent more 
than USD 4.5 billion throughout the war (Hayner, 2010).  
Militarily, the El Salvadoran government initially used conventional warfare tactics 
against the FMLN, but as the insurgents’ guerrilla strategies continued to dupe the government, 
ARENA employed counterinsurgent death squads to carry out more targeted extrajudicial attacks 
(Karl, 1992). Before the war, the government elite had a strong hold on the nation’s economy 
(land, mines, trade, coffee, etc.) and resisted submitting to FMLN and US requests to initiate 
economic reforms to resolve some of the socioeconomic disparity in the country. As such, the 
government created economic task forces comprised of business elites to maintain power against 
FMLN takeovers of fields and mines (Karl, 1992). Diplomatically, El Salvador was less 
aggressive than the FMLN in pursuing relations, as it already had the extensive support of the 
US and much of the anti-communist international community. Table 5.2 compares these features 




vary. It is these characteristics that help inform both insurgent and counterinsurgent level of 
civilian violence throughout the course of the El Salvador civil war.  
(Table 5.2) 
Tracing Civilian Abuses in El Salvador’s Civil War 
 The twelve-year civil war devastated El Salvador’s agricultural areas and cities, while 
also taking the lives of over 75,000 civilians massive displacement of the El Salvadoran 
population (Allison, 2012; McKinney, 2015). Since the formation of the FMLN, the 
government’s counterinsurgency strategy involved the subjugation of rural civilians to 
indiscriminate violence, displacement, and death squads. US support for the government was 
conditional on maintaining international law, but despite repeated high-level threats of aid cuts, 
the El Salvadoran armed forces had a human rights record the Pentagon considered “no truly 
democratic and just society could tolerate” (Schwarz, 1991). In the mid-1980s, the war was no 
longer a battle between equally strong sides, as the government began increasingly winning 
confrontations with the FMLN. Violence ensued, and by 1984, the number of internally 
displaced peoples (IDPs) reached 1.5 million and killings per year rose to the tens of thousands. 
While the FMLN increased its guerrilla campaigns against government facilities, economic 
centers, and landmines, the government increased aerial bombing and death squad campaigns 
(these were often indiscriminate and specifically targeted civilians in order to displace them from 
territory controlled by the FMLN) (Peceny & Stanley, 2010).  
 The final violent episode occurred in 1989 in San Salvador and several large cities during 
the end of 1989. The FMLN conducted a final offensive, to which the government responded in 
attacks that resulted in the death of 2,000 civilians, including six Jesuit priests, their housekeeper, 




US withdrawing all military aid in 1990 (World Peace Foundation, 2015). At this point in the 
conflict, both sides accepted they were not capable of definitive victory. The Cold War was also 
nearing the end of its course, which reduced outside support for military solutions on both sides. 
What resulted was a push for a UN-mediated peace negotiation as well as a ceasefire. By January 
of 1992, the final peace accords were signed in Mexico City and the FMLN transitioned into a 
politically-recognized and legitimate party (World Peace Foundation, 2015).  
 In the same year, a Truth Commission (TC) was created to review the fatalities of the 
civil war. According to the TC, 85% of “serious acts of violence” were attributed to the state, 
with over 60% of these incidents being extrajudicial executions, 25% enforced disappearances, 
and 20% complaints of torture (TC, 1992). This amounted to nearly 63,750 civilian casualties. 
Most of this indiscriminate violence was concentrated in rural areas were the FMLN had strong 
support—  only 5% of incidents were reported in urban areas. As for civilian killings attributed 
to the FMLN, the TC reported that only 15% (roughly 11,250 deaths) of the civilian deaths were 
due to FMLN. Most of the FMLN’s violence and civilian abuses occurred in conflict zones 
where the FMLN had military control. While the FMLN employed violence against non-
combatants, at no point during the conflict did the insurgent level of abuses amount to the 
number of abuses caused by the El Salvadoran government (World Peace Foundation, 2015).  
 It is this latter point that is particularly relevant to the present research. Throughout the 
course of the civil war, the FMLN was dedicated to winning the “hearts and minds” of civilians 
during the civil war (Wood, 2003). Its military strategies, though aimed at toppling the 
government, were calculated so as to avoid as many civilian deaths and abuses as possible. Its 
compliance to civilian protection and international law stands in stark contrast to other notorious 




maintained cooperative relations with civilians, refrained from using child soldiers and attempted 
to avoid indiscriminate mistreatment of enemy government soldiers. The FMLN self-described 
their war tactics as being consistent with international human rights standards and signed the San 
Jose Agreement in 1990 stating “Bearing in mind that the Frente Farabundo Martí para la 
Liberacion Nacional has the capacity and the will and assumes the commitment to respect the 
inherent attributes of the human person…” (San Jose Agreement, 1990). Of course, the FMLN 
did indeed employ some violence in ways that violated human rights rules, but their record is 
nowhere near to the abuses committed by the El Salvadoran government. Even in high-intensity 
conflict areas, the FMLN exhibited restraint to human rights abuses (Jo, 2015).  
In assessing why the FMLN showed this level of restraint toward civilian abuses, Jo 
employs her theory of legitimacy-seeking characteristics. What largely explains the FMLN’s 
cooperation, loyalty, and restraint with civilians is its strong political wing and ideology. The 
FMLN’s involvement with the political scene—  it is its political aims that spurred the insurgent 
force into development at the start of the civil conflict— demonstrates both a history and future 
of governance. While a solely-militaristic group could be recognized as viable leaders by local 
populations, having a political arm and motivation ensures it potential to reach out to domestic 
constituents, conduct diplomacy, and maintain awareness of international affairs and law (Jo, 
2015). The FMLN exhibited all of these political characteristics and used them extensively in 
gathering local and foreign support. After fighting the government for twelve years, the FMLN is 
the second largest political party in the country, winning 3.5% more votes than ARENA in the 
2003 Legislative Assembly, which gave them more seats than any other single party in the El 




ties with the constituency that they could have accessed the political process and secured the 
ability to influence public policy in El Salvador.  
5.3: Bringing It All Together  
 These cases reveal critical insights about insurgent restraint toward the employment of 
violence against non-combatant individuals. The discussed rebel forces who showed some extent 
of restraint and compliance with international law all share a common legitimacy-seeking 
characteristic: a strong political wing and aim. In the case of M23, the rebel group had an active 
political wing that sought international legitimacy for their movement. With its influential 
political wing, M23 fought to secure conditions the of the peace agreement in 2009, as well as 
gain greater government representation for Tutsi minorities. Though its political wing was 
armed, compared to the rebel groups in the DRC who lacked the same political arm and goals 
(such as the FDLR and AFDL), M23 demonstrated a higher level of compliance with 
international law toward civilians (Human Rights Watch, 2010). Even in the case of the MLC, 
which operated in both the DRC and CAR, the group committed far fewer abuses in the DRC 
since it had a reason to be politically motivated in that country. The same could not be said about 
the CAR, as the insurgent force did not have political goals or an active arm in that country (Jo, 
2015). 
In El Salvador, the FMLN’s treatment of civilians follows a similar trend. Since its 
creation, the rebel group has been motivated by clear political goals: to spur transience of power 
in El Salvador, introduce leftist-working class citizens in the government, and initiate land 
reform laws that allow for the working class to enjoy welfare benefits and securities. In 
achieving these political goals, the FMLN developed an active political arm, showed loyalty to 




atrocities were reported in high-conflict areas, the FMLN committed far fewer abuses than the 
US-backed El Salvadoran government (World Peace Foundation, 2015). The FMLN’s strong 
political arm motivated its efforts to contact foreign sympathizers and alliances, which provided 
the rebel group with extensive support from various states— many of which follow international 
human rights laws themselves.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Jo contends that the second indicator of legitimacy-seeking 
rebel groups is human rights-conscious foreign sponsorship. Insurgent forces that rely on human 
rights-following external supporter are influenced and pressured by these supporters. 
Consequently, the insurgent groups refrain from committing as many civilian abuses toward non-
combatants. Compared to political motivations, there is less evidence of this indicator 
influencing civilian treatment both the DRC rebels and the FMLN cases. In the DRC, M23 and 
various other rebel groups (Mai Mai, MLC, RCD, UPC, AFDL, FRPI, and FNI) all received 
some form of support from the Rwandan or Ugandan government, and in some cases both. 
Despite receiving funding from the same sources, each rebel group engaged with civilians 
differently. While M23, MLC, and UPC demonstrated more restraint in regards to civilian 
violence, the remaining rebel groups committed far greater abuses, despite all of them receiving 
support from at least one of the two nations (Table 5.1).  
In the case of FMLN, the question of human rights-conscious external support is 
particularly interesting, as the most significant sponsor of the conflict was the US, what is 
considered an archetype of human rights-following, democratic standards. Against the backdrop 
of the Cold War, the US heavily funded the El Salvadoran government—  this support gave the 
government the resources to conduct air raids, death squad campaigns, and other forms of 




for nearly a decade. The FMLN, though not completely innocent of civilian abuses, received 
support from various countries (those who were more human-rights conscious than others, such 
as Costa Rica and Mexico) but employed far less violence than the government (Kyle, 2004). 
These discrepancies in foreign support and human rights compliance shed light on the 
“democratic effect” that is tested in Salehyan et al.’s study (2014). The authors find that rebel 
groups who receive support from foreign states that are democratic—  and thus are more likely to 
be influenced by human rights organizations and international law—  will commit fewer 
numbers of civilian abuses than those supported by non-democratic states (Salehyan et al., 2014). 
In these two discussed cases, the same relationship does not entirely hold and suggests further 
research must be conducted on this particular feature of foreign sponsorship. 
Ultimately, the following cases help inform why the statistical analysis yielded entirely 
insignificant coefficients. These examples are an abbreviation of all cases of foreign support and 
rebel treatment of individuals, but analyzing particular exploratory cases allows this thesis to 
move forward, looking for trends that can inform future research regarding the question at hand. 
What these two cases do seem to display is that a rebel group’s decision to show restraint toward 
civilians is more likely a result of internal characteristics, rather than external ones. In both the 
DRC and El Salvador, insurgent forces who demonstrated a proclivity of cooperation with 
civilians, restraint from high levels of extrajudicial violence, and greater compliance with 
international law were characterized by having clear political goals and a political wing that 





Discussion and Conclusion  
6.1: Discussion of Key Findings  
Previous literature has extensively explored insurgent behaviors in times of conflict, 
examining the relationships between exogenous variables and insurgent use of violence in civil 
wars from 1944 onward. In particular, previous scholars have explored how foreign support 
influences an insurgent group’s use of violence against civilians (Weinstein, 2007; Weinstein, 
2005; Salehyan et al., 2014). The thesis has contributed to this body of literature, pursuing the 
following question: how does foreign sponsorship affect civilian targeting by supported 
insurgent groups? In answering this question, the following research employs both a quantitative 
and qualitative approach to understanding insurgent violence. The study estimates a logistic 
regression with variables from the 2016 Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict (STAC) 
Dataset, controlling for various conflict, insurgent, government, and intervention features. The 
study extends these findings by continuing with two case studies that offer a comprehensive look 
at insurgent violence in two conflicts: the years following the First and Second Congo Wars and 
the El Salvadoran civil war.  
The quantitative portion of this study finds coefficients that are all insignificant. The first 
model—  the study’s most basic regression—  tests the relationship solely between foreign 
sponsorship and insurgent-led violence. Models 2 through 6 examine types of external aid (arms, 
combat, economic, sanctions, and military assistance or advising); Models 7 through 13 consider 
insurgent strength relative to its government adversary, government tactics, and conflict 




factors that previous literature has contended is relevant to the research question, no regression 
under any model yielded significance at the 0.05 threshold—  thus, there is no observed 
relationship between external sponsorship and insurgent-led violence in this analysis.  
The inconsistencies and variance among literature on the studied question prompted the 
present research to explore specific case studies in search of trends that previous literature 
supports or rejects. The two cases examined rebel groups who have received foreign support but 
have not committed civilian abuses, and vice versa. In the DRC, the case study finds that the 
M23 insurgency stands out from many competing rebel groups due to its strong political arm and 
goals. Compared to rival rebel groups, M23 (and other politically-conscious rebel groups) 
committed fewer abuses than insurgencies like the FDLR and AFDL, despite the fact that these 
groups all received some form of external state support from either Uganda, Rwanda, or both 
(Table 5.1). The case study suggested that it was M23’s conscious focus on political legitimacy 
and freedom that guided M23 to employ less violence. This internal feature indicates that M23 
seeks legitimacy and is thus far more aware of international criminal law and prosecution (Jo, 
2015). Groups with this internal characteristic, such as M23 and MLC in the DRC, are more 
likely to adjust their tactics so that they commit fewer abuses toward non-combatant civilians.  
The second study finds similar conclusions. When tracing the use of violence in El 
Salvador’s civil war, the government is the point of comparison to the FMLN—  the nation’s 
leftist-communist rebel group. Throughout the civil war, the FMLN and government forces 
maintained a strong presence in the state until both actors signed an interim treaty in 1991. The 
FMLN maintained a consistent effort to build cooperative relationships with civilians in the area, 
as they were dedicated to winning the “hearts and minds” of civilians during the period of 




including Cuba, Mexico, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. But despite this extensive support, the 
FMLN was only responsible for 15% of civilian violence throughout the war (World Peace 
Foundation, 2015). The US played a notable role in this conflict, funding approximately $4.5 
billion to the El Salvadoran government, which committed far more civilian abuses and 
killings—  roughly 63,750 in twelve years (Hayner, 2010; World Peace Foundation, 2015). In 
understanding why the FMLN refrained from civilian violence, the case study finds that the 
FMLN’s strong political arm motivated its efforts to cooperate and show restraint toward 
civilians, while also contacting foreign sympathizers and alliances.  
The common thread between these two cases is that rebel groups who refrain from 
committing civilian abuses embody a specific legitimacy-seeking characteristic: having a strong 
political wing and aim. Jo (2015) introduces the theory of legitimacy-based rebel compliance, 
which suggests that rebel groups with 1) strong political wing and goals, 2) support from human 
rights-conscious groups, and 3) secessionist aims are more likely to comply with international 
law and engage in less civilian-targeted violence. Though the statistical analysis does not 
consider all of these features, the case studies supports the first part of Jo’s theory. Rebels with 
clear political wings and goals demonstrate a commitment to future governance. While a solely 
militaristic group could be viewed as a viable form of leadership for civilians, having a political 
focus allows for the group to collaborate and cooperate with the constituency, leaving little room 
for wartime atrocities. Insurgent groups with this characteristic “take the fight from the 
battlefield to the political arena” and are aware of international affairs and international law (Jo, 
2015). The behavioral result of these characteristics is a lower employment of civilian violence, 




As for Jo’s (2015) remaining legitimacy-based theory components, the statistical analysis 
did not find a significant coefficient when considering external support and secessionist 
conflicts. The secessionist characteristic is not observed in the case studies, though there is some 
discussion of the human rights-conscious/democratic sponsorship effect. Despite not receiving 
support from a human-rights/democratic sponsor, M23 and equally compliant insurgent groups 
in the DRC demonstrated restraint with civilian abuses (Table 5.1; HRW, 2010; Trefon, 2013). 
In the case of the FMLN, some of its supporters exhibited human right-conscious and democratic 
tendencies (Costa Rico and Mexico), which may have contributed to its refrain from committing 
a large number of civilian abuses. Both Jo (2015) and Salehyan et al. (2014) find significance 
when considering this feature of the foreign sponsor, but the statistical analysis and case studies 
do not fully support their conclusions.  
Ultimately, the statistical analysis of this thesis does not support any of the prior literature 
discussed in the previous chapters. It is widely argued within the field of insurgent behavior that 
rebel groups with foreign support are more likely to be commit abuses toward non-combatant 
civilians in civil conflicts, but the present research suggests that we ought to reconsider the 
relationship between these two variables, as their interaction is not so certain.  As the case 
studies attempt to explore this relationship further, the qualitative analysis finds that what most 
explains a rebel group’s refrain from civilian violence is whether or not it has an explicit political 
arm and clear political goals.  
6.2: Limitations and Rival Hypothesis  
Of course, data availability is a long-standing and consistent barrier to civil conflict 
research. Most data on this topic only crudely account for the amount of support provided and 




2015). The thesis utilizes the Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict Dataset (STAC) (2016), 
which includes 200 observations from civil conflicts between the years of 1946 and 2013. The 
statistical analysis does not incorporate conflicts that fall outside of this range, resulting in an 
emphasis on conflicts falling within the Cold War era. While the STAC dataset has far fewer 
missing data points compared to the UCDP, NSA, ACLED, and OSC datasets, the 198 rebel 
group observations only account for primary opposition groups in a conflict country. As 
demonstrated by the case in the DRC, there are often many insurgent operations within one 
country during a conflict (HRW, 2010).  Lastly, because the STAC dataset’s variables are either 
binary or categorical, the statistical analysis is unable to derive the extent or magnitude of 
variables such as foreign support or rebel victimization of civilians.  
The statistical analysis also fails to consider two features of external support for insurgent 
groups: multiple foreign supporters and the effect of sponsorship from a democratic versus non-
democratic state. These two features were central to Salehyan et al.’s (2014) hypotheses, who 
find that democratic sponsors are more likely to pressure insurgents to commit fewer abuses, 
while the existence of multiple principals dilutes this effect. The STAC dataset does not include 
variables for these characteristics, so they were not included in the quantitative analysis of this 
thesis. This is a limitation of the study, as the incorporation of these variables may have provided 
significant results and further informed our understanding of these features of external support. 
Nonetheless, they were explored in the qualitative section of the analysis.  
Because only two case studies were explored in this thesis, the qualitative analysis is also 
limited. Though rebel groups in the DRC and the FMLN are informative in representing 
examples of the interaction between foreign support and insurgent violence toward civilians, 




starting point from which to begin drawing trends and preliminary conclusions, but it would be 
erroneous to extend the findings of these two case studies to all rebel groups, particularly those 
from different conflict contexts, backgrounds, and characteristics. The cases are drawn from 
different decades, geopolitical, and social contexts—while the analysis observed a trend in 
political aims, the differences in these cases should not go unnoticed.   
Ultimately, the research does not observe a significant relationship between external 
sponsorship and rebel civilian targeting; thus, the hypothesis that rebel groups who receive 
external support are more likely to abuse non-combatant civilians was rejected. Following the 
qualitative analysis, the thesis concludes that among all observed features in the case studies, a 
rebel group’s political arm and goals was the most likely contributor its collaboration with 
civilians. This conclusion begs the following question: is insurgent treatment of civilians more 
likely a result of internal features than external support? The thesis did not find significance with 
external support as the key test variable, nor did it find any particular trend in external support 
and civilian violence in the case studies. It did, however, find that civilian abuses are correlated 
with internal traits—for example, stronger rebels in the DRC committed far more abuses and the 
FMLN’s diplomatic tendencies motivated its restraint (Jo, 2015; Grenier, 1991). Perhaps a rival 
hypothesis worth pursuing is that insurgent-led violence is a function of internal characteristics 
rather than external factors.  
6.3: Implications for Policy  
Civil wars extend beyond the conflict country’s borders and warring actors. Though 
defined at the intrastate level, civil conflicts often transform into an arena for international actors 
to implement various agendas, manipulate outcomes, and associate with global causes that align 




in civil conflicts is through the provision of support (Heger & Salehyan, 2007; Cunningham, 
2010; Regan, 2002; Salehyan et al., 2014). As such, the policy-makers in the international 
community—such as members of foreign affairs committees, ministries and cabinets—must be 
aware of the implications foreign support may have on conflict behaviors. This thesis and its 
conclusion can thus inform policy-makers in several ways. 
First, given the conclusion that insurgent groups with strong political aims are less likely 
to target civilians, external supporters who are interested in maintaining low levels of civilian 
abuses should support rebel groups with this internal characteristic. The findings indicate that 
insurgent groups with this characteristic are less prone to civilian targeting, despite the fact that 
they are receiving foreign support. Foreign powers can be more confident that these insurgent 
groups will demonstrate restraint toward civilians. Thus, if a foreign actor is interested in 
supporting an opposition force, it should look for this characteristic to prevent a more significant 
number of war atrocities. Second, a foreign actor can specifically support or advise an insurgent 
group in a manner that develops this characteristic further. If a foreign country wants to bolster 
an opposition group against a particular government but does not find that an insurgent force 
displays a proclivity for political legitimacy, the foreign country can alter its support to augment 
this characteristic. Third, policy-makers can impose conditions under which support is provided 
to incentivize sponsored groups from committing acts of violence.  
Foreign support is critical for a rebel group’s survival against a more powerful regime 
(Wood, 2010; Kalyvas, 2006; Salehyan et al., 2014). A foreign actor can leverage its position as 
a sponsor system by placing conditions on the provision support. For example, a foreign actor 
can provide insurgent groups weapons so long as the group abides by international human rights 




foreign sponsors, as they impose human rights conditions on rebel organizations more often than 
non-democratic ones. Though foreign sponsors have practiced this policy alternative, the lack of 
regulation of conditions allow for rebel behaviors go by without consequences (Salehyan et al., 
2014). If foreign sponsors wish to place conditions on support, they must be appropriately 
enforced to manage the level of abuses in civil conflicts.  Ultimately, despite the fact that the 
results of the statistical analysis suggest there is not a significant relationship between external 
support and civilian targeting, this research is not definitive. It cannot be said that never does 
external support contribute to civilian abuse. There must still be pressure be placed on external 
states that can shape combatant behavior to mitigate harmful insurgent behaviors in periods of 
conflict.  
 One of the most contemporary and ongoing foreign sponsorship debates centers around 
the US’s position in the Syrian crisis. In 2011, Syria followed the footsteps of fellow Arab 
countries, joining the list of nations involved in what was later coined the “Arab Spring.” The 
Syrian conflict began when peaceful demonstrators took up arms and formed rebel groups under 
the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) (O’Bagy, 2013). Since its inception, the Syrian 
opposition has struggled with unity —  now, the exact number of rebel groups is difficult to 
determine, but there are estimated to be as many as 1,000 armed and self-described Syrian 
opposition groups (Sinjab, 2013). Despite the internally fractious nature of the FSA, it remained 
one of the biggest anti-regime forces in the opposition pool, receiving covert aid (arms and 
supplies) from the US’s Central Intelligence Agency in an attempt to close in on the Islamic 
State’s stronghold in northern Syria (Sanger et al., 2017). In 2016, it was also reported that the 
US Department of Defense was providing arms, training, and air support to another anti-Assad 




the Syrian crisis, there has been contentious debate about the US’s role in supporting anti-regime 
groups. Still traumatized from US involvement in the Gulf War, those who opposed US 
involvement feared the loss of lives, upsetting NATO allies in the region, and potentially 
bolstering a force with extremist ties. By January of 2018, the US backed out as sponsor for both 
the FSA and the YPG, particularly due to threats from Turkey’s regime, which considers the 
Kurdish YPG forces a “terrorist group” (Gumrukcu, 2018).  
The conclusions of this thesis are relevant to the case of rebel groups in Syria. The US’s 
interests in the Syrian conflict extend beyond just the minimization of the loss of lives—  it also 
aims to combat the spread of ISIS, maintain alliances in the region, and hold the Assad regime 
accountable for atrocities committed against its people (Schmitt, 2016). As such, despite 
claiming its withdrawal from supporting Syrian rebels, the sponsorship debate is not yet over 
(Alaaldin, 2018). In deciding whether or not to continue supporting rebel groups or which rebel 
group to support, the US government can apply the conclusions found in this study. The FSA has 
political aims and has worked with the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), the political wing of the 
Syrian opposition forces. It also participated in humanitarian training, worked with Geneva Call 
(an NGO dedicated to humanitarian affairs), and pledged to withhold from child soldiering 
(O’Bagy, 2013). However, the FSA’s coordination with the SNC lacked strength, and the group 
failed to provide resources for civilians in rebel-held areas. These latter factors impeded the 
ability to cooperate with local civilians (O’Bagy, 2013). In contrast, the YPG has strong political 
goals—it has held elections and worked closely with the Syrian Democratic Force (SDF). Due to 
its ethnic allegiance to the Kurdish cause, the YPG is equally secessionist, dedicated to securing 
its own sovereign nation. These goals motivate YPG to collaborate extensively with local 




YPG’s restraint is that it is the only group to sign the Deed of Commitment against sexual 
violence, child laboring, and anti-personnel mines with Geneva Call (Geneva Call, 2018). With 
these rebel characteristics in mind, the present research suggests that if the US wishes to continue 
sponsoring an opposition force in Syria, the YPG is more likely to commit fewer civilian abuses. 
The YPG’s strong political goals, though they overlap with their secessionist position, situate 
this rebel group to be more cooperative with its local population.  
6.4: Directions for Future Research 
Of course, policy efforts to intervene in a civil conflict or engage with rebels are rarely 
conducted in isolation. Outcomes of sponsorship, intervention, and other forms of engagement 
are influenced by a number of factors external to the relationship between a rebel group and a 
foreign actor (Jo, 2015). It is thus difficult to predict the precise sequence of events following 
rebel engagement. This thesis is an attempt to shed light on this very interaction, as well as offer 
policy prescription for foreign actors engaging in international civil conflicts. It has been 
concluded that the relationship between external support and insurgent violence is insignificant, 
and that politically-legitimate rebel groups are more prone to show restraint toward civilians. 
Nonetheless, these findings are not definitive, and further research must be done to continue 
understanding and contributing to the study of rebel behaviors in times of civil conflict.  
First, further research should accompany the case studies in this thesis with a statistical 
analysis of internal political characteristics and their effect on insurgent violence. Indeed, the 
thesis finds that politically-motivated groups are less likely to target civilians, but future studies 
should probe this conclusion further. Do rebel groups with elections, a rival constitution, or 
diplomatic characteristics show more restraint toward the local population? To what extent does 




to address some of these questions, as both this thesis and prior literature do not consider these 
items in an in-depth manner.  
Second, future research should address the broader relationship in question: the 
interaction between external support and insurgents’ treatment of civilians. Does external support 
at a certain time of conflict affect insurgent behaviors? In other words, when does external 
support in a conflict’s duration yield the best results? How does an intervention by the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) or United Nations affect insurgent behaviors? What if the 
external support is a Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) or a private sector organization?  
As hinted by the case in Syria, are fragmented oppositions more likely to employ violence 
against civilians after receiving external support? These are just some of the questions that can 
begin to fill the gaps in this research as well as the body of literature covering this topic.  
Conflicts and rebel groups are not monolithic, and discovering new ways in which 
external factors contribute to insurgent behavior is immensely critical to understand how civilian 
violence can be prevented. This thesis is just one attempt to examine the ways in which the 
international community engages with conflict actors, but research on this topic should not stop 
here. At the most fundamental level, civilian lives are at stake—the policy and scholarly 
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Insurgent Treatment of Civilians 
(civtargreb_bin) 
0.46 0.5 
External Support (targsupp) 0.59 0.5 
Rebel Strength (strongreb) 0.16 0.37 
Government Civilian Targeting (civtarget):     
Rare  0.44 0.5 
Moderate 0.23 0.42 
Extensive  0.33 0.47 
Government Airstrikes (strategicair):     
None 0.67 0.47 
Minor 0.18 0.39 
Moderate 0.10 0.30 
Extensive  0.05 0.21 
Combat Support (asstcombat) 0.25 0.43 
Arms Support (asstarms) 0.47 0.5 
Economic Support (asstecon) 0.35 0.48 
Sanctions Support (asstsanct) 0.40 0.49 
Advising Support (targhelp) 0.35 0.48 
Religious Conflict (conflictrelig) 0.12 0.33 
Secessionist Conflict (conflictsecess)  0.31 0.46 
Ethnic Conflict (conflictethnic) 0.39 0.49 
Ideological Conflict (conflictideol) 0.43 0.50 
Notes:  N=200. Data come from the Strategies and Tactics in Armed Conflict 




Table 4.1: Regression Results for External Support and Rebel Violence 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 
Number of Observations 153 153 153 153 153 152 
Constant Estimate  -0.19 -0.21 -0.05 -0.28 -0.21 -0.28 
 (0.26) (0.19) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) 
External Support 
(targsupp) 0.03           
  (0.34)           
Combat Support 
(asstcombat)   0.16         
    (0.37)         
Arms Support (asstarms)     -0.24       
      (0.33)       
Economic Support 
(asstecon)       0.28     
        (0.33)     
Sanctions Support 
(asstsanct)         0.09   
          (0.33)   
Military Assistance and 
Advising Support 
(targhelp)           0.24 
              (0.34) 






Table 4.2: Regression Results for External Support and Rebel Violence; Controlling for 
Insurgent, Government and Conflict Characteristics  
 
 Model 7  Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11  Model 12 Model 13 
Number of Observations  123 150 150 152 152 152 152 
Constant Estimate  -0.12 0.09 -0.54 -0.38 -0.50 0.08 0.14 
 (0.24) (0.35) (0.28) (0.22) (-0.14) (-0.32) (-0.33) 
Advising Support 





  (0.37) (0.35)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.34) (0.34) 
Rebel Strength 
(strongreb)   0.41        
  
  (0.53)           
Government Airstrikes 
(strategicair)    -0.28       
  
    (0.21)         
Government Civilian 
Targeting (civtarget)     0.30     
  
      (0.19)       
Religious Conflict 
(conflictrelig)       0.78   
  
        (0.48)     
Secessionist Conflict 
(conflictsecess)         -0.50  
  
          (0.36)    
Ethnic Conflict 




      (0.33)  
Ideological Conflict 
(conflictideol) 
       
0.14 
       (0.33) 










































































NA NA NA NA Around 
15,000 




















































































Table 5.2: Insurgent and Counterinsurgent Characteristics and Abuses in El Salvador’s 
Civil War 

























tactics; "bleed" out 
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